Tinubu`s Secret Boko Haram Deal

Army expands as hidden ceasefire raises explosive questions over Nigeria’s war on terror

Behind the government’s public campaign to crush terrorism, a very different battle may have been unfolding in secret. While President Bola Tinubu was ordering the Nigerian Army to recruit 30,000 additional soldiers and creating four new military divisions, government-linked channels were allegedly negotiating a temporary truce with Boko Haram.

At the centre of the clandestine arrangement: 360 civilians abducted in Borno State, an alleged ₦5 billion payment and a ceasefire that may have given one of Nigeria’s most notorious insurgent groups valuable time to regroup.

The government has not publicly acknowledged the reported truce and has denied allegations that it paid ransom. But the conflicting accounts surrounding the release of the hostages have opened a troubling question at the heart of Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy:

Is Abuja preparing to defeat Boko Haram—or quietly learning to negotiate with it? The answer could determine the next phase of Nigeria’s 17-year insurgency.

The secret that followed the hostage release

The story began in March, when Boko Haram fighters attacked a military position around Ngoshe, a remote community in Borno State near the Cameroon border. The assault was followed by the abduction of about 360 civilians. For weeks, the hostages remained in the hands of their captors. Then, in June, they came home.

The Nigerian military portrayed the episode as a successful intelligence-led operation, suggesting that security forces had penetrated insurgent territory and secured the civilians' release. But another account has emerged.

People familiar with the insurgents' activities say the release was connected to negotiations between Boko Haram and government representatives and formed part of a wider arrangement that temporarily halted hostilities in the area.

If that account is correct, the Ngoshe operation was not simply a military rescue. It was a negotiation. And that distinction matters. Because Nigeria has spent years insisting that Boko Haram must be defeated, not accommodated.

The alleged ₦5 billion question

The most explosive allegation is that Boko Haram received approximately ₦5 billion as part of the arrangement.

The government denies paying such a ransom. The allegation remains unproven. But if the payment were ever confirmed, it would expose one of the most difficult dilemmas confronting the Nigerian government: whether saving hundreds of civilians can justify financially rewarding the organisation responsible for abducting them.

For families waiting for their loved ones, the calculation is brutally simple. A hostage alive is better than a hostage dead.For a government fighting an insurgency, however, the calculation is far more complicated. Every successful ransom can potentially become a business model.

Kidnap civilians.

Demand money.

Negotiate.

Release the hostages.

Repeat. That is the cycle security officials fear most.

What Boko Haram may have gained

Money may not have been the only benefit. The reported agreement allegedly reduced military pressure around parts of Ngoshe for several months. For an insurgent organisation, even a temporary pause can be valuable. It can provide time to move fighters, replenish supplies, repair equipment, recruit new members and strengthen positions. In an insurgency, time is often as important as territory.

That is why a ceasefire that appears to benefit civilians in the short term can become a security problem if it allows an armed group to rebuild.The critical question is therefore not simply whether the truce stopped fighting. It is what Boko Haram did while the fighting stopped.

Who was talking to whom?

The identities of the people who allegedly negotiated the arrangement remain unclear.Nigeria has previously used intelligence and security channels to communicate with insurgents, particularly when hostages were involved or when government officials were exploring defections and ceasefires.

Such contacts are often deliberately kept outside the public eye. There is no established evidence that Tinubu personally negotiated with Boko Haram.But the existence of a reported ceasefire, if confirmed, would raise a much broader question: who within the Nigerian security establishment authorised or facilitated the talks? And how far did the negotiations go? Was the objective simply to secure the hostages? Was it to establish a temporary local ceasefire? Or was Abuja testing the possibility of a much larger political settlement? The government has not publicly answered those questions.

The 360 civilians caught in the middle

For the abducted civilians, the politics of the agreement mattered less than survival. They had been taken from their homes and held by an armed group operating in one of Nigeria's most dangerous regions. Their release in June brought relief to their families. But the episode also carried a terrible human cost. Two infants reportedly died while in captivity, victims of the conditions under which the hostages were held.Their deaths underline the reality behind the political debate.Every negotiation over Boko Haram involves real people whose lives can depend on whether government officials choose to fight, negotiate or do both.

Then Tinubu ordered more soldiers

And just as the reported truce was taking shape, Tinubu was moving aggressively to strengthen the military.The president approved the creation of four additional Army divisions and plans to recruit about 30,000 new soldiers.

The message was unmistakable: Nigeria was preparing for more war. The Army is already deployed across multiple security fronts.In the northeast, troops are battling Boko Haram and ISWAP. Across the northwest and north-central regions, soldiers are confronting bandit groups and kidnappers. Elsewhere, the military is dealing with communal violence and other armed threats.The result is an Army stretched across a country facing several simultaneous security crises.Tinubu's expansion plan is designed to put more soldiers on the ground and give commanders greater capacity to sustain operations. But it also raises a striking question. Why expand the war machine while secretly negotiating with one of the country's principal enemies?

The answer may be simple: Abuja wants both options

The apparent contradiction may actually be the strategy. Military force gives the government leverage. Negotiations can deliver hostages.A ceasefire can temporarily reduce civilian casualties.And an expanded Army can ensure that the government is not negotiating from a position of weakness.

In other words, Tinubu may be attempting to pursue two tracks simultaneously:Fight Boko Haram. Talk to Boko Haram.The danger is that the two strategies can undermine each other.A military campaign loses credibility if insurgents believe kidnapping can bring them to the negotiating table.Negotiations lose credibility if the government continues expanding military operations while refusing to acknowledge that talks are taking place.

And then there is ISWAP

Even a successful deal with Boko Haram would not end Nigeria's jihadist problem. Islamic State West Africa Province remains a separate and powerful threat in the northeast. ISWAP and Boko Haram have fought each other as bitter rivals, but both have inflicted enormous damage on Nigerian communities. That creates a complicated battlefield for Abuja.

A ceasefire with one faction could theoretically allow the military to concentrate on another.But it could also create new alliances, rivalries and power struggles among the insurgents.There is no guarantee that today's ceasefire partner will remain tomorrow's partner.

A dangerous precedent

The greatest concern may be what the reported agreement teaches other armed groups.If kidnapping produces negotiations, and negotiations produce money or territory or a reduction in military pressure, then kidnapping becomes more attractive. Nigeria already faces an enormous kidnapping crisis.

Any perception that the federal government is willing to pay armed groups could have consequences far beyond Borno State.

That is why transparency matters.The government does not necessarily have to reveal operational details that could endanger future negotiations.But Nigerians have a legitimate interest in knowing whether their government is paying terrorists, granting concessions or entering into formal ceasefires.

A war at a crossroads

Tinubu inherited a conflict that has survived multiple military offensives, leadership changes and international counterterrorism campaigns. Boko Haram has been weakened at different points, but the insurgency has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to adapt.The reported Ngoshe arrangement may therefore represent something bigger than a single hostage negotiation.It may signal that Abuja is confronting a reality that previous governments struggled to acknowledge:There may be no purely military solution to Nigeria's insurgency.

But accepting that reality carries its own risks. Negotiate too little, and hostages may die.Negotiate too much, and insurgents may become emboldened.Pay nothing, and civilians may remain captive.Pay too much, and kidnapping can become an industry.Launch more military operations, and the government risks prolonging a war that has already lasted nearly two decades. Stand down, and Boko Haram may interpret restraint as weakness.

The unanswered questions

For now, the Nigerian government has offered no comprehensive public explanation of the alleged truce.That leaves a series of questions hanging over the administration:

- Who negotiated the reported ceasefire?
- Who authorised the talks?
- Was any money paid to Boko Haram?
- What exactly was agreed in exchange for the release of the 360 civilians?
- Did the Nigerian military know about the arrangement?
- What did Boko Haram promise in return?
- Did the insurgents use the ceasefire to regroup?
- Will the agreement be extended?
- And does Tinubu ultimately believe Boko Haram can be defeated—or must it be negotiated into submission?

The answers could redefine Nigeria's counterterrorism policy. For now, the president is building a bigger Army while a reported secret truce quietly unfolds in the shadows. That may not be a contradiction. It may be the clearest indication yet that Nigeria's war against Boko Haram has entered a new and far more complicated phase.
The battlefield is expanding. The Army is growing. And behind closed doors, someone may already be negotiating the next move.